Florida Senate - 2018 (NP) SB 22 By Senator Braynon 35-00148-18 201822__ 1 A bill to be entitled 2 An act for the relief of Brian Pitts; directing the 3 Division of Administrative Hearings to appoint an 4 administrative law judge or special master to 5 determine a basis for equitable relief for the purpose 6 of compensating Mr. Pitts for the wrongful acts or 7 omissions of the State of Florida or officials 8 thereof; requiring a report to the Legislature; 9 authorizing compensation to Mr. Pitts upon a 10 determination by an administrative law judge; 11 providing an appropriation to compensate Mr. Pitts for 12 injuries and damages sustained; providing a limitation 13 on attorney fees and costs; directing that certain 14 court orders and judgments be declared null and void; 15 directing that the clerk of the court for the Supreme 16 Court and for the Sixth Judicial Circuit remove access 17 to specified cases; directing the Department of Law 18 Enforcement to remove access to criminal records 19 related to Mr. Pitts and to ensure the compliance, 20 execution, and enforcement of specified provisions; 21 specifying the limited circumstances under which Mr. 22 Pitts may represent himself or others in judicial or 23 administrative proceedings; directing the Department 24 of Law Enforcement to investigate certain illegal acts 25 committed by certain persons; authorizing the 26 Governor, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker 27 of the House of Representatives to sever portions of 28 this act under certain circumstances; providing an 29 effective date. 30 31 WHEREAS, this state has clearly recognized the practice of 32 law by lay persons since at least 1980 as declared in The 33 Florida Bar v. Moses, 380 So. 2d 412, 416-418 (Fla. 1980), and 34 in The Florida Bar re Advisory Opinion on Nonlawyer 35 Representation in Securities Arbitration, 696 So. 2d 1178, 1180 36 1181, 1183-1184 (Fla. 1997), the Legislature and judiciary 37 having concurrent jurisdiction to regulate such, and 38 WHEREAS, Brian Pitts has exercised this privilege since 39 2001 in Pinellas County, and his practice was later enjoined by 40 the Florida Supreme Court in case number SC02-247, in a final 41 order dated November 6, 2003. As stated in the order, 42 “respondent Brian Pitts is enjoined from engaging in the 43 practice of law in the State of Florida as specified in the 44 referee’s report. Specifically, respondent is hereby enjoined 45 from engaging in any of the following activities: (1) appearing 46 in any Florida court as a representative of a party, giving 47 legal advice in a Florida case, or otherwise participating in 48 any Florida litigation on behalf of any party unless otherwise 49 authorized by Florida Statutes, court rule, case law, 50 administrative rule, or the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar . . 51 . .” See The Florida Bar v. Pitts, 861 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 52 2003)(No. SC02-247, November 6, 2003), 53 www.floridasupremecourt.org, and 54 WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts contends that, since the inception of 55 Mr. Pitts’ practice, the Second District Court of Appeal, the 56 Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida serving Pasco and Pinellas 57 Counties, the State Attorney’s Office for the Sixth Judicial 58 Circuit of Florida, and The Florida Bar have, without cause, 59 continued to deprive Mr. Pitts of the privilege of practicing 60 law as prescribed by the Legislature and Florida Supreme Court, 61 subjecting him to civil and criminal proceedings and penalties 62 on an ongoing basis, and 63 WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts opines that the Florida Supreme Court, 64 in its 2003 final order in case number SC02-247, has subjected 65 him to entrapment and needlessly and unjustly avoided and failed 66 to exercise its constitutional duty upon his many requests to 67 clarify or amend the final order or to promulgate court rules 68 through The Florida Bar following original proceedings brought 69 or suggested by Mr. Pitts to correct the matter, and 70 WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts believes that from 2001 to 2012 the 71 courts, The Florida Bar, and the State Attorney’s Office for the 72 Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida engaged in a course of 73 misconduct and colluded against Mr. Pitts in case numbers SC02 74 247, SC06-1279, CRCAB-65835CFANO, CRCAB-90407CFANO, CRC07 75 12964CFANO, CTC07-03965MMANO, CTC03-01885MMANO, CTC03 76 01887MMANO, and CTC03-09855MMANO and that such misconduct 77 resulted in his wrongful and unlawful incarceration in the 78 Pinellas County Jail for a total of nearly 1 year, and 79 WHEREAS, the purpose of this course of misconduct was, in 80 Mr. Pitts’ opinion, to retaliate against him for not being a 81 member of The Florida Bar despite being otherwise lawfully 82 authorized to represent certain individuals whom he assisted in 83 legitimate legal matters and, by way of his detainment, to 84 thwart his pending pro se actions for relief from the collusion 85 by civil, appellate, or original proceedings directed to or from 86 the above criminal cases, and 87 WHEREAS, appearing pro se in many of his cases, Mr. Pitts 88 was complimented by several judges of the Sixth Judicial Circuit 89 for an exceptional degree of technical and performance 90 competence that would be expected of any trained and experienced 91 member of The Florida Bar, yet he was informed by express or 92 implied communication that he would not receive the relief 93 requested in any such proceeding unless represented by a member 94 of The Florida Bar, as a matter of camaraderie, and 95 WHEREAS, although Mr. Pitts appeared pro se in these cases 96 and other actions seeking relief from such collusion, he was at 97 times represented by appointed counsel; however, such 98 proceedings proved to be futile because, Mr. Pitts contends, the 99 proceedings were staged by the courts and the State Attorney’s 100 Office for the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida to be illusory, 101 and 102 WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts contends that the courts failed to abide 103 by binding precedent and stare decisis, where applicable, as 104 well as Florida Rules of Court, as evidenced by the series of 105 filings in each case by Mr. Pitts, or his court-appointed 106 counsel, hence depriving Mr. Pitts of procedural due process and 107 substantive due process, equal protection of the law, self 108 representation, and representation by counsel under the United 109 States Constitution, and 110 WHEREAS, the Second District Court of Appeal declared in 111 Denson v. State, 711 So. 2d 1225, 1230 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), that 112 “appellate judges take an oath to uphold the law and the 113 constitution of this state. The citizens of this state properly 114 expect these judges to protect their rights. When reviewing an 115 appeal with a preserved issue, if we discover that a person has 116 been subjected to a patently illegal sentence to which no 117 objection was lodged in the trial court, neither the 118 constitution nor our own consciences will allow us to remain 119 silent and hope that the prisoner, untrained in the law, will 120 somehow discover the error and request its correction. If three 121 appellate judges, like a statue of the ‘see no evil, hear no 122 evil, speak no evil’ monkeys, declined to consider such serious, 123 patent errors, we would jeopardize the public’s trust and 124 confidence in the institution of courts of law.” Compare Bedford 125 v. State, 633 So. 2d 13, 14 (Fla. 1994), and 126 WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts contends that the judges who presided in 127 his cases have deliberately and intentionally, in concert with 128 the Florida Supreme Court justices, failed to abide by these 129 rules of law as to Mr. Pitts’ cases on appeal or by original 130 proceedings brought and maintained by him or his counsel, and 131 WHEREAS, it has become evident, in Mr. Pitts’ opinion, that 132 The Florida Bar, the State Attorney’s Office for the Sixth 133 Judicial Circuit of Florida, and the judges and justices 134 involved at each level of Mr. Pitts’ cases all have a personal 135 and private, rather than public, interest at issue in deterring 136 Mr. Pitts from engaging in the authorized practice of law as 137 prescribed in this state, and 138 WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts believes that such determent is due to a 139 matter of camaraderie among those of the legal profession and an 140 interest in protecting it by any means from lawful competition, 141 where applicable, and 142 WHEREAS, this determent demonstrates a lack of neutrality, 143 proper motives, and discretion which deprives Mr. Pitts of the 144 required process and means of justice or resolution as normally 145 expected of esteemed persons in their official capacities, and 146 WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts believes that the Pinellas County 147 Sheriff’s Office further participated in the concerted effort of 148 the courts, The Florida Bar, and the State Attorney’s Office for 149 the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida by illegally incarcerating 150 him in the Pinellas County Jail during the periods of January 151 2003 through April 2004 and March 12, 2010, through July 4, 152 2010, refusing him administrative alternative sentencing without 153 cause, and subjecting him to living conditions and circumstances 154 in violation of Florida Model Jail Standards (2.15)(c); (4.12); 155 (4.13); (4.15); (5.08)(a), (c)(1)-(8), and (j); (6.02); 156 (9.06)(b); (9.08); (9.10); (10.01); (11.12); (11.16); 157 (12.03)(d)-(g) and (i); (12.06); and Appendix A; and ss. 951.03 158 and 951.033(3), Florida Statutes, and 159 WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts also contends that the Pinellas County 160 Sheriff’s Office further participated in the concerted effort of 161 the courts, The Florida Bar, and the State Attorney’s Office for 162 the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida by extending his sentence 163 by an additional 50 days of detention in violation of Inmate 164 Handbook XI. A., Florida Model Jail Standard (4.16), and ss. 165 951.21(1) and 921.16(1), Florida Statutes, which subjected him 166 to cruel and unusual punishment, false imprisonment, and a 167 denial of due process and equal protection of the law. See 168 Miller v. Carson, 599 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1979); Miller v. 169 Carson, 563 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1977); Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 170 741 (5th Cir. 1977); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835 (M.D. 171 Fla. 1975); Miller v. Carson, 392 F. Supp. 515 (M.D. Fla. 1975); 172 Solomos v. Jenne, 776 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Douthit v. 173 Jones, 619 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1980), and 174 WHEREAS, such conditions and circumstances of the jail are 175 reflected in a St. Petersburg Times article dated July 5, 2010, 176 appearing under the headline “Thousands of Pinellas jail inmates 177 released without a judge ever setting bail,” which is 178 complemented by a series of articles released by the Orlando 179 Sentinel, including “Florida’s suspect jails: The state’s hands 180 off approach to inspecting jails leaves them vulnerable,” dated 181 April 8, 2010; “Jail-standards chief defends system of checks,” 182 dated May 15, 2010; “If all Central Florida jails rate an A, is 183 it deserved?” dated May 15, 2010; and “Beef up jail oversight: 184 Florida jails need tough oversight, not coddling,” dated May 18, 185 2010; and other articles, and 186 WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts contends that such conduct was a clear 187 abuse of judicial, executive, and administrative authority as to 188 the state court system and local government, including the State 189 Attorney’s Office for the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida and 190 the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office, which resulted in a public 191 embarrassment to this state because such authorities knew that 192 there was not any basis in fact or law for their unlawful acts 193 against him, and 194 WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts believes that his good name and 195 reputation have been damaged; he has been deprived of due 196 process, the ability to conduct a lawful business, freedom of 197 speech, property, liberty, and equal protection of the law; he 198 has not benefited from constitutional protections against 199 unlawful trusts by public officers and employees under oath of 200 office and double jeopardy protections as to criminal 201 proceedings and sanctions; and he has suffered mental anguish 202 and emotional distress as the result of the intentional 203 misconduct and gross negligence of the courts, the State 204 Attorney’s Office for the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida, The 205 Florida Bar, and the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office relating 206 to his practice of law as a nonlawyer in this state, and, 207 further, that there is no state-action exception to federal 208 antitrust laws, which were violated in the subject cases, and 209 WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts has suffered, and continues to suffer, 210 significant monetary damage by virtue of lost income, lost 211 property, lost time, and expenses, fees, fines, costs, and 212 required restitution resulting from the civil and criminal 213 proceedings relating to his alleged unauthorized or unlicensed 214 practice of law, and 215 WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts frequently appears before the 216 Legislature to instruct, advise, inform, and advocate for or 217 against proposed legislation covering a broad spectrum of topics 218 and subject matter in fact and law with an exceptional degree of 219 technical competence that would be expected of any trained and 220 experienced member of The Florida Bar, and 221 WHEREAS, the Legislature recognizes that no system of 222 justice is impervious to human error, and 223 WHEREAS, the Legislature acknowledges that any system of 224 justice may sometimes yield imperfect results that may have 225 tragic consequences, and 226 WHEREAS, this claim is based on a moral and legal 227 obligation of the Legislature to acknowledge its actions and act 228 on its authority to correct a wrong when those actions have 229 resulted in a manifest injustice or disregard for the law, and 230 WHEREAS, the filing of this claim bill is in accord with 231 the holdings of the Florida Supreme Court regarding legislative 232 claim bills. See Circuit Court of Twelfth Judicial Circuit v. 233 Dep’t of Natural Res., 339 So. 2d 1113, 1116-1117 (Fla. 234 1976)(”Absent legislation waiving the state’s sovereign immunity 235 . . . this Court cannot authorize relief through the judicial 236 process”); Gerard v. Dep’t of Transp., 472 So. 2d 1170, 1172 237 (Fla. 1985)(“[W]e agree with the Department of Transportation’s 238 assertion that a judgment in this case was not a prerequisite to 239 Gerard’s filing a claims bill in the legislature.”), and 240 WHEREAS, the First District Court of Appeal in Jetton v. 241 Jacksonville Electric Authority, 399 So. 2d 396, 397 (Fla. 1st 242 DCA 1981), stated that although the Legislature has placed 243 limits on recovery, “claimants remain free to seek legislative 244 relief bills, as they did during days of complete sovereign 245 immunity,” and 246 WHEREAS, the Florida Supreme Court in Dickinson v. Bradley, 247 298 So. 2d 352, 354 (Fla. 1974), held that “any claim bill is 248 restricted to less than the general public and its purpose is to 249 discharge the state’s moral obligation to any individual or 250 other entity whom or which the legislature recognizes as being 251 entitled to such. . . . The legislature may enact a claim bill 252 for what would be a tort if a private party was involved just as 253 effectively as for what would constitute a contractual debt,” 254 and 255 WHEREAS, the Legislature intends that any compensation made 256 pursuant to this act be the sole compensation provided by the 257 state for any and all present and future claims arising out of 258 the facts presented in this act, NOW, THEREFORE, 259 260 Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida: 261 262 Section 1. The facts stated in the preamble to this act are 263 found and declared to be true, and all judicial and 264 administrative remedies were exhausted as of September 9, 2003 265 April 30, 2004; September 30, 2005; May 21, 2007; September 7, 266 2007; December 12, 2008; September 14, 2009; February 22, 2010; 267 March 11-July 4, 2010; and March 30, 2012, respectively. 268 Section 2. The Division of Administrative Hearings shall 269 appoint an administrative law judge, or a special master shall 270 be appointed, to conduct a hearing to determine a basis for 271 equitable relief for the purpose of compensating Brian Pitts for 272 any wrongful act or omission of the State of Florida, the State 273 Attorney’s Office for the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida, and 274 the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office regarding investigations 275 involving Mr. Pitts, the civil and criminal proceedings relating 276 to Mr. Pitts’ alleged unauthorized or unlicensed practice of 277 law, and his incarcerations totaling nearly 12 months from 2001 278 to 2012, if not longer. 279 Section 3. (1) The administrative law judge or special 280 master shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence 281 whether the State of Florida, the State Attorney’s Office for 282 the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida, or the Pinellas County 283 Sheriff’s Office committed a wrongful act or omission and 284 whether a basis for equitable relief exists, and if it so finds, 285 the administrative law judge or special master shall award Mr. 286 Pitts an amount of up to $7 million, but not less than $1 287 million, to be paid proportionately by the parties that wronged 288 him and to be paid in a lump sum or in payments over a period of 289 no more than 10 years. 290 (2) The administrative law judge or special master shall 291 report his or her determination to the President of the Senate 292 and the Speaker of the House of Representatives by July 1, 2018. 293 The Chief Financial Officer is directed to draw a warrant in 294 satisfaction of the relief awarded by the administrative law 295 judge, special master, or Legislature, as provided in this act, 296 and to pay the warrant out of the Administrative Trust Fund or 297 State Courts Revenue Trust Fund within the state courts system 298 and the State Attorneys Revenue Trust Fund to Brian Pitts. 299 Pinellas County shall pay the warrant out of its general revenue 300 fund or by other means it has provided to pay valid claims 301 against it relating to the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office and 302 as to its share of the total award to Mr. Pitts. 303 (3) This award is intended to provide the sole compensation 304 for all present and future claims arising out of the factual 305 situation described in this act which resulted in unlawful or 306 unconstitutional acts committed against Mr. Pitts in connection 307 with allegations, judgments, and convictions of the unauthorized 308 or unlicensed practice of law and his incarcerations totaling 309 nearly 12 months, if not longer, from 2001 through 2012. The 310 total amount paid for attorney fees, lobbying fees, costs, and 311 other similar expenses relating to this claim may not exceed 25 312 percent of the amount awarded under this act. 313 (4) All final orders, judgments, decrees, and convictions, 314 and orders or liens pertaining to fees, fines, costs, and 315 restitution, rendered in cases SC06-1279, SC09-195 and SC09 316 2243, CRCAB-90407CFANO, CRCAB-65835CFANO, CRC07-12964CFANO, 317 CTC07-03965MMANO, CTC03-09855MMANO, CTC03-01885MMANO, and CTC03 318 01887MMANO in which Mr. Pitts is the respondent or defendant are 319 null and void by this act by virtue of the doctrine of 320 separation of powers because the courts failed to recognize the 321 Legislature’s lawful and valid enactments, in addition to the 322 courts’ own lawful and valid case precedent, rules, and orders, 323 authorizing lay representation as expressed in The Florida Bar 324 v. Moses, 380 So. 2d 412, 416-418 (Fla. 1980); by virtue of 325 inherent authority of this Legislature as expressed in Florida 326 House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 611 (Fla. 327 2008) and Trianon Park Condominium Ass’n v. City of Hialeah, 468 328 So. 2d 912, 918, 919 (Fla. 1985); by virtue of checks and 329 balances exercised by this Legislature as expressed in State Ex 330 Rel. Young v. Duval County, 79 So. 692, 697 (Fla. 1918), in 331 which the court found, “[a] clear violation of the 332 constitutional provisions dividing the powers of government into 333 departments should be checked and remedied.” As the court found 334 in State v. City of Stuart, 120 So. 335, 346 (Fla. 1929), “[t]he 335 general rule is that the Legislature is supreme in the 336 legislative field, which is the most powerful branch of 337 government, so long as it does not violate any of the provisions 338 of the organic law. There is to our minds no justifiable 339 exception of any class of legislation from this all-pervasive 340 and fundamental principle.” Finally, by virtue of the cases 341 involving Mr. Pitts, the courts failed to comply with the 342 mandates of s. 20.02(1), Florida Statutes, which states that 343 “[t]he judicial branch has the purpose of determining the 344 constitutional propriety of the policies and programs and of 345 adjudicating any conflicts arising from the interpretation or 346 application of the laws.” 347 (5) The clerk of the court for the Florida Supreme Court, 348 as to cases SC06-1279, SC09-195, and SC09-2243, and the clerk of 349 the court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, as to cases CRCAB 350 90407CFANO, CRCAB-65835CFANO, CRC07-12964CFANO, CTC07 351 03965MMANO, CTC03-09855MMANO, CTC03-01885MMANO, and CTC03 352 01887MMANO, all pertaining to Mr. Pitts, are hereby directed to 353 remove from public and private access all dockets, records, 354 documents, and recorded orders or liens related to those cases 355 and transmit them to the Department of Law Enforcement to 356 fulfill the duties required under section 6 of this act. The 357 Department of Law Enforcement is hereby directed to remove from 358 public and private access all record history and information of 359 a criminal nature concerning Mr. Pitts. This record history and 360 information include, but are not limited to, fingerprints, felon 361 registration, and all other matters concerning the case numbers 362 cited in this subsection. These records, information, or 363 documents may not be used by or accessed for any purpose by 364 anyone unless access to those records is required by federal 365 authorities or for investigations conducted under section 6 of 366 this act. 367 (6) The Department of Law Enforcement is directed to ensure 368 the compliance, execution, and enforcement of subsections (4) 369 and (5) of this section and section 6, and shall provide 370 protective services to Mr. Pitts ensuring his rights, 371 privileges, and safety under sections 4, 5, and 6 of this act. 372 Section 4. In accordance with the Florida Supreme Court’s 373 final order in case number SC02-247 and the exception contained 374 in clause (1) of that order, unless otherwise authorized by 375 Florida Statutes, court rule, case law, administrative rule, or 376 the rules regulating The Florida Bar, thereby authorizing Mr. 377 Pitts to practice law in this state, the Legislature authorizes 378 Mr. Pitts to practice law in this state under the following 379 designations, titles, rules, decisions, or acts in the capacity 380 as a lay counselor or lay representative: 381 (1) Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, relating to a qualified 382 representative. 383 (2) Chapter 44, Florida Statutes, relating to a designated 384 representative. 385 (3) Chapter 709, Florida Statutes, relating to an attorney 386 in-fact under a durable power of attorney, when coupled with an 387 interest in any personal or property claim, election, right, or 388 interest. 389 (4) Decisions or rules of the Florida Supreme Court 390 relating to representation in real property management. 391 (5) Decisions or rules of the Florida Supreme Court 392 relating to a nonlawyer using approved forms. 393 (6) Decisions or rules of the Florida Supreme Court 394 relating to representation in county or small claims civil 395 proceedings. 396 (7) Decisions or rules of the Florida Supreme Court 397 relating to third-party standing representation. 398 (8) Rule 5-15, Rules of the Supreme Court Relating to 399 Admission to the Bar. 400 (9) Judicial discretion under the inherent authority 401 doctrine. 402 (10) Federal law, state law, local rule, statute, local 403 law, or any other court or administrative decision or order 404 issued under federal, state, or local law and authority. 405 Section 5. Any appearance or public testimony given by Mr. 406 Pitts on bills or matters before the Legislature, wherever held 407 or convened throughout this state, does not constitute the 408 practice of law. In all circumstances Mr. Pitts retains the 409 right to represent himself at any time he has valid standing 410 supported by law. If Mr. Pitts is the subject of civil, 411 administrative, or criminal proceedings, he retains the right to 412 represent himself without a lawyer in court and in 413 administrative actions or cases. 414 Section 6. Due to the ongoing conduct from 2001 to 2012 415 against Mr. Pitts as described in the preamble of this act, the 416 Legislature directs the Department of Law Enforcement, assisted 417 by Mr. Pitts, to investigate these acts committed by: 418 (1) The Florida Supreme Court justices involved for 419 violations of s. 914.22(2)(f) or (4)(f), Florida Statutes, and 420 18 U.S.C. 1512, relating to their final ruling rendered on 421 February 22, 2010, in case number SC06-1279, which resulted in 422 the incarceration of Mr. Pitts on the eve of the 2010 423 Legislative Session while proceedings on SB 58 were pending, and 424 in Mr. Pitts’ cases relating to motions, reviews, and original 425 proceedings for violations of ss. 542.21(2), 775.15(12)(b), 426 777.04(2) and (3), 836.05, 838.015, 838.016, 838.022, 839.13(1), 427 839.24, 843.03, 843.0855(2) and (3), 876.10, 895.03, and 918.13, 428 Florida Statutes; 15 U.S.C. 1, 2, and 3; and 18 U.S.C. 201, 241, 429 242, 1951, and 1962. 430 (2) The Second District Court of Appeal judges assigned to 431 Mr. Pitts’ cases on motions, reviews, and original proceedings; 432 the Sixth Judicial Circuit judges; and the state attorneys 433 involved in violations of ss. 542.21(2), 775.15(12)(b), 434 777.04(2) and (3), 836.05, 838.015, 838.016, 838.022, 839.13(1), 435 839.24, 843.03, 843.0855(2) and (3), 876.10, 895.03, and 918.13, 436 Florida Statutes; 15 U.S.C. 1, 2, and 3; and 18 U.S.C. 201, 241, 437 242, 1951, and 1962. 438 (3) The Florida Bar and its representatives who pursued 439 charges of unlicensed practice of law against Mr. Pitts for 440 their violations of ss. 542.21(2), 777.04(2) and (3), 836.05, 441 838.015, 838.016, 839.13(1), 895.03, and 918.13, Florida 442 Statutes; 15 U.S.C. 1, 2, and 3; and 18 U.S.C. 201, 241, 242, 443 1951, and 1962. 444 (4) The Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office for violations of 445 ss. 775.15(12)(b), 839.13(1), 843.03, 843.0855(2) and (3), 446 876.10, 950.09, and 951.14, Florida Statutes, and 18 U.S.C. 201, 447 241, or 242. 448 449 The Department of Law Enforcement shall exercise all authority 450 granted to it under general law to investigate criminal 451 violations under this act and shall refer any evidence of such 452 crimes to the appropriate state attorney for prosecution. 453 Failure of the Department to Law Enforcement to investigate 454 these criminal violations and refer any evidence of such 455 violations to the appropriate officials is a misdemeanor of the 456 first degree under s. 775.15(12)(b), Florida Statutes. Charges 457 arising out of the criminal investigation shall be brought 458 before a grand jury impaneled in Leon County within 1 year after 459 passage of this act. 460 Section 7. The Governor, the President of the Senate, or 461 the Speaker of the House of Representatives may sever in whole 462 or in part any section of this act, excluding this section, 463 which remaining parts shall be in full force and effect upon 464 becoming law. Notwithstanding severance, Brian Pitts shall 465 retain the right or privilege during future legislative sessions 466 to request the relief severed in whole or in part by virtue of 467 this section until fully remedied. 468 Section 8. This act shall take effect upon becoming a law.