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A bill to be entitled |
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An act relating to procurement of personal property and |
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services; creating s. 287.019, F.S.; defining |
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"privatization"; requiring the head of a state agency, |
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prior to the purchase, lease, or acquisition of |
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commodities or contractual services by privatization, to |
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conduct an evaluation of the proposed privatization; |
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requiring the head of a state agency, subsequent to the |
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purchase, lease, or acquisition of commodities or |
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contractual services by privatization, to conduct an |
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evaluation of the privatization; providing evaluation |
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criteria; requiring the State Council for Competitive |
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Government to conduct a quarterly review of completed |
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agency privatization evaluations; providing that a vendor |
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must be a domiciled state corporation or have a |
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significant business presence in the state; providing an |
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effective date. |
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WHEREAS, a continuing issue in government reform is the |
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option of privatizing public services, and |
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WHEREAS, privatization is often proposed as a way to |
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improve public services, with proponents claiming that |
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privatization can cut government waste, increase employee |
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productivity, and save tax dollars, and |
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WHEREAS, however, concerns have been raised that |
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privatization can cost more than it saves, can lead to the loss |
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of public control over government services, and may reduce |
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service quality, and |
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WHEREAS, experience has shown that privatization can work |
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well in some cases, produces mixed results in others, and can |
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raise a variety of problems if the process is not well managed, |
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and |
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WHEREAS, privatization in Florida is occurring in a host of |
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public services, ranging from delivery of social services to |
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building roads, and |
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WHEREAS, Florida is also outsourcing government programs |
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and services through public-private partnerships, and |
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WHEREAS, in these partnerships, which are an alternative to |
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full privatization, the private sector and government assume |
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joint responsibility for the design and delivery of public |
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programs and services, and |
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WHEREAS, when assessing privatization potential, the best |
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candidates are programs where there are clearly defined tasks to |
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be performed, good unit cost data can be developed for |
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comparison, good quality and quantity measures are available so |
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that service delivery can be monitored, and private sector |
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service providers already exist, and |
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WHEREAS, it must also be recognized that it may be |
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difficult to privatize many state functions, and |
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WHEREAS, for example, programs that involve the state's |
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police power in which issues of fairness and equity are critical |
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are not good candidates for privatization, and |
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WHEREAS, it should be recognized that market competition, |
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rather than privatization itself, produces cost savings, and |
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WHEREAS, private companies have incentives to reduce their |
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costs to increase profits and market share, whereas government |
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agencies commonly do not face such competition, and |
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WHEREAS, however, when agencies have been placed in a |
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competitive situation, they have frequently improved their |
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performance and were able to under-bid private vendors, and |
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WHEREAS, it is in the public interest of the citizens of |
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the State of Florida that a diligent, comprehensive, ongoing |
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effort at providing realistic assessments and evaluations of |
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privatization efforts be undertaken, NOW, THEREFORE, |
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Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida: |
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Section 1. Section 287.019, Florida Statutes, is created |
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to read: |
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287.019 Privatization evaluation and assessment.--
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(1) For the purposes of this section, "privatization" |
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means entering into a contract with one or more private entities |
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for the purchase, lease, or acquisition of any commodity or |
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contractual service required by an agency of the state under |
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this chapter when:
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(a) It is maintained by the department that such commodity |
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or contractual service can be provided in a more efficient |
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manner by a private entity; and
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(b) The expenditure by the contracting agency for the |
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purchase, lease, or acquisition of commodities or contractual |
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services meets or exceeds the threshold amount provided in s. |
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287.017 for CATEGORY FIVE:
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1. Twice in any 1-year period; or
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2. Four or more times during any 3-year period.
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(2) Prior to the purchase, lease, or acquisition of any |
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commodity or contractual service required by an agency of the |
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state under this chapter which meets the definition provided in |
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subsection (1), the head of the state agency shall conduct an |
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evaluation of the proposed privatization which shall |
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specifically address the potential for the privatization to |
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result in a verifiable cost savings. If it is determined that |
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the proposed privatization will result in a verifiable cost |
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savings, the evaluation must ascertain whether the cost savings |
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be will directly attributable to any of the following:
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(a) Lower labor costs than that of the state agency.
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(b) Reduced regulatory requirements.
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(c) Reduced overhead.
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(d) Increased flexibility with respect to the motivation, |
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reward, and termination of employees.
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(e) Access to better equipment than that available to the |
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state agency.
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(f) The ability to react more quickly to changing |
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conditions than the state agency. If so was this ability |
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attributable to:
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1. An ability to shift funds to pay unexpected expenses |
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without the encumbrance of budget transfer authority under which |
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the state agency must operate.
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2. An ability to expand operations more quickly than the |
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state agency.
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(g) Staffing flexibility, including the ability to obtain |
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specialized expertise by contract or through the hiring of a |
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consultant for one-time occasional projects.
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(h) The avoidance of political factors, which may include |
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the use of private-sector experts not aligned or associated with |
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partisan political groups.
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(i) The avoidance of prohibitive or excessive start-up |
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costs needed to provide appropriate up-front funding for service |
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infrastructure.
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(3) One year after entering into a contract for the |
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purchase, lease, or acquisition of any commodity or contractual |
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service required by an agency of the state under this chapter |
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which meets the definition provided in subsection (1), the head |
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of the state agency shall conduct an evaluation of the results |
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of the privatization to determine whether the privatization |
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yielded or failed to yield the projected cost savings based on |
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the evaluation conducted pursuant to subsection (2) prior to |
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entering into the contract, and an evaluation of the results of |
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the privatization during its first year which shall specifically |
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address whether the privatization resulted in a verifiable cost |
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increase. If it is determined that the privatization resulted in |
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a verifiable cost increase, the evaluation must ascertain |
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whether the cost increase was directly attributable to any of |
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the following: |
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(a) Reduced public accountability. If so, did the lack of |
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public accountability or reduced public accountability manifest |
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itself in increased costs resulting from:
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1. Lack of public access to service and financial records |
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maintained by the provider.
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2. Variations in the quality of services being provided to |
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citizens.
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3. Entering into a contract the term of which was too |
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lengthy, thus precluding the ability to adjust to a changing |
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condition or circumstance.
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4. A resultant inability to gauge or monitor poor |
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performance. In an instance where such an inability and poor |
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performance resulted in termination of a contract, was increased |
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cost and or hardship incurred because:
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a. The contractor was a sole-source provider of a service; |
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or
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b. The contractor was providing a service in which no |
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service disruptions could be tolerated.
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(b) Service quality problems which include, but are not |
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limited to:
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1. Providing service to only those who do not have many |
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needs, commonly known as "creaming."
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2. Identifiable cost-cutting measures that result in cost |
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increases including, but not limited to, frequent replacement of |
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poorly maintained equipment.
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3. Service quality problems that arise from contract |
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deficiencies which include, but are not limited to:
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a. Poorly defined responsibilities of the contractor;
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b. Lack of service quality performance measures;
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c. The absence of penalties for nonperformance;
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d. The absence of contingency plans.
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(c) Higher long-term costs. If so, did the higher long- |
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term costs result from: |
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1. The submission by the contractor of a low initial bid |
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in order to obtain the contract followed by substantially |
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increasing costs in subsequent years when the agency previously |
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providing the service no longer has the staff or authority to |
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perform the service.
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2. The acceptance of a contract bid that appears low but |
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is in actuality higher than the in-house costs of the agency due |
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to the agency's inability to determine the actual cost of |
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providing services in-house because of agency accounting systems |
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which do not allocate all direct and indirect costs to services.
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3. Failure in the request for proposals that solicited the |
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bid for the service to mandate that the contractor achieve a |
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specified level of savings.
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4. Failure of the contract to limit future price |
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increases.
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(d) Workforce issues including, but not limited to:
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1. Employee layoffs resulting in morale problems.
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2. Union challenges to privatization.
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3. Disruptions resulting from bumping rights when affected |
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employees assume jobs in other areas.
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4. Failure of an agency's ability to meet Equal Employment |
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Opportunity goals and subsequent discrimination challenges |
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resulting from inordinate numbers of minority groups being |
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removed from state payrolls.
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5. Failure in a contract to require the contractor to |
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guarantee jobs and wages for a limited time period.
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(6) The State Council for Competitive Government must |
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conduct a quarterly review of each completed agency |
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privatization evaluation required pursuant to subsection (3). |
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The council may authorize the Office of Program Policy Analysis |
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and Governmental Accountability to conduct the quarterly reviews |
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required under this subsection. |
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Section 2. Any other provision of law to the contrary |
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notwithstanding, a contract for services, request for proposals, |
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or invitation to bid between an agency of the state and a |
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contract vendor succeeding to the operation of a program or |
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function of a state agency shall not be executed unless the |
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vendor is a domiciled corporation in this state or has a |
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significant business presence in the state for the duration of |
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the contract. For purposes of this section, the term |
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"significant business presence" means a retention of |
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substantially all of the filed positions previously assigned to |
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the state agency at substantially the same total cash equivalent |
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of salaries and benefits.
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Section 3. This act shall take effect upon becoming a law. |