



**THE FLORIDA SENATE**  
**SPECIAL MASTER ON CLAIM BILLS**

**Location**

302 Senate Office Building

**Mailing Address**

404 South Monroe Street  
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1100  
(850) 487-5237

DATE	COMM	ACTION
1/29/17	SM	Favorable
	JU	
	CA	
	RC	

March 16, 2017

The Honorable Joe Negron  
President, The Florida Senate  
Suite 409, The Capitol  
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1100

Re: **SB 298** – Senator Darryl Rouson  
**HB 6517** – Representative Ramon Alexander  
Relief of Reginald Jackson

**SPECIAL MASTER'S FINAL REPORT**

THIS IS A CONTESTED EXCESS JUDGMENT CLAIM FOR \$312,500 BASED ON A JURY AWARD FOR THE CLAIMANT REGINALD JACKSON AND AGAINST THE CITY OF LAKELAND FOR INJURIES SUSTAINED BY THE CLAIMANT WHEN HE WAS SHOT IN THE NECK BY A LAKELAND POLICE OFFICER AFTER A TRAFFIC STOP.

**CURRENT STATUS:**

This claim bill was previously filed with the Legislature for the 2010 Legislative Session. At that time, it was heard by Bram D. E. Canter, an administrative law judge from the Division of Administrative Hearings, serving as a Senate Special Master. After the hearing, the judge issued a report containing findings of fact and conclusions of law and recommended that the bill be reported FAVORABLY. Judge Canter's special master report from SB 66 (2010), the latest report available, is attached.

SPECIAL MASTER'S FINAL REPORT – SB 298

March 16, 2017

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Respectfully submitted,

Thomas C. Cibula  
Senate Special Master

cc: Secretary of the Senate



**THE FLORIDA SENATE**  
**SPECIAL MASTER ON CLAIM BILLS**

*Location*  
402 Senate Office Building

*Mailing Address*  
404 South Monroe Street  
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1100  
(850) 487-5237

DATE	COMM	ACTION
12/04/09	SM	Favorable

December 4, 2009

The Honorable Jeff Atwater  
President, The Florida Senate  
Suite 409, The Capitol  
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1100

Re: **SB 66 (2010)** – Senator Chris Smith  
Relief of Reginald Jackson

**SPECIAL MASTER'S FINAL REPORT**

THIS IS A CONTESTED EXCESS JUDGMENT CLAIM FOR \$312,500 BASED ON A JURY AWARD FOR THE CLAIMANT REGINALD JACKSON AND AGAINST THE CITY OF LAKE LAND FOR INJURIES SUSTAINED BY THE CLAIMANT WHEN HE WAS SHOT IN THE NECK BY A LAKE LAND POLICE OFFICER AFTER A TRAFFIC STOP.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

On October 18, 2001, around midnight, Reginald Jackson, then 24 years old, was driving home on Memorial Boulevard in Lakeland after picking up his girlfriend's 18-month-old brother from a relative's house. Officer Michael Cochran of the Lakeland Police Department was behind Jackson in a marked patrol car. Officer Cochran entered Jackson's tag number in his computer which indicated that there was a discrepancy. Officer Cochran turned on his flashing lights and pulled Jackson over. Officer Cochran asked Jackson for his license and vehicle registration. When Jackson's registration looked in order, Officer Cochran returned to his patrol car and ran the tag number again. There was no problem with Jackson's vehicle tag. Officer Cochran realized that he had initially entered the wrong tag number.

However, Officer Cochran had observed that Jackson had a child in the front passenger seat who was not in a child car seat. Officer Cochran proceeded to write Jackson a citation for transporting a child without a car seat. He told Jackson that Jackson could not drive home without a car seat and would have to get someone to bring a car seat for the child. Jackson asked Officer Cochran if he could follow the officer to Jackson's home, which was nearby, but Officer Cochran declined. Officer Cochran then drove away.

Jackson tried to use a pay phone close to where his car had been pulled over, but the phone was not working. Jackson saw another pay phone in the parking lot of a lounge a block away, so he got back into his car and drove to the lounge. Meanwhile, Officer Cochran had lingered nearby in an alleyway, apparently to observe Jackson because Officer Cochran suspected that Jackson would not obey the instruction not to drive anywhere unless the child was in a car seat. When Officer Cochran saw Jackson drive away, he immediately followed Jackson and pulled into the parking lot of the lounge with the intent to arrest Jackson.

Officer Cochran exited his patrol car and approached Jackson, who was at or near the pay phone, telling Jackson that he was under arrest. Jackson replied that he was just using the pay phone and he walked quickly to his car, got in, started it up, backed up a short distance, and then put the vehicle in "drive" with the intent to drive away. Jackson explained his reaction as caused by his being startled and confused. It was also asserted by his attorneys that, because Jackson is an African American and Officer Cochran is white, Jackson believed that Officer Cochran was acting out of racism. Jackson did not say that he feared he would be physically harmed by Officer Cochran.

Officer Cochran drew his handgun and positioned himself in front of Jackson's car, on the driver's side, with his body to the side of the front right tire and his left hand on the fender of the car. As Jackson slowly moved the car forward, Officer Cochran was yelling for Jackson to "stop or I'll shoot." Officer Cochran then shot through the windshield, striking Jackson in the neck. The bullet passed through Jackson's neck and came out of his back. The shot fired by Officer Cochran was reasonably calculated to kill Jackson. Jackson momentarily lost consciousness and his car continued forward and crossed

all lanes of Memorial Boulevard. Jackson regained consciousness in time to apply the brakes and prevent the car from crashing into a storefront.

The written policies of the Lakeland Police Department regarding the use of firearms by police officers state that their use “shall be limited to those situations in which lethal defensive action is warranted,” and firearms are not to be drawn or displayed unless there is a “reasonable suspicion of a threat of death or great bodily harm to an officer or another person.”

Officer Cochran claimed that he feared for his life because he believed Jackson was attempting to run him over with the car. The more persuasive evidence indicates that, if Officer Cochran feared for his life, it was an unreasonable fear. The car was rolling forward slowly. The evidence is ambiguous as to whether Officer Cochran was positioned to the side of the car or slightly in front of the car. However, even if he was positioned slightly in front of the car, the more persuasive evidence indicates he could have side-stepped or dodged the car by moving to his right. His decision to end the “threat” by shooting to kill Jackson was not a reasonable act. Although Jackson’s actions in returning to his car and beginning to drive away indicated that he was going to resist arrest and flee, his actions did not give rise to a reasonable belief that he intended to kill or cause serious bodily harm to Officer Cochran.

The gunshot wound left Jackson with a permanent brachial plexus injury which is an injury to nerves that control shoulder, arm, and hand movements. There is no surgery or treatment that can repair the damage. As a result of the injury, Jackson has intermittent pain, numbness, or tingling in his right arm and hand. His right arm is also weaker.

LITIGATION HISTORY:

Jackson filed a lawsuit in 2005 against the City in the circuit court for Polk County. Following a three-day trial, the jury determined that the City was 75 percent at fault and Jackson was 25 percent at fault. The jury verdict was \$550,000. Applying the 75/25 split, the circuit court issued a final judgment against the City for \$412,500. The City paid the sovereign immunity limit of \$100,000, leaving a balance of \$312,500 to seek through a claim bill.

CLAIMANT'S POSITION: Officer Cochran was negligent in the use of his firearm and the jury award is fair and reasonable.

THE CITY'S POSITION: Officer Cochran's actions were reasonable under the circumstances. Jackson is solely responsible for his injury.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: The claim bill hearing was a *de novo* proceeding for the purpose of determining, based on the evidence presented to the Special Master, whether the City is liable in negligence for the injuries suffered by Jackson and, if so, whether the amount of the claim is reasonable.

It was claimed that Officer Cochran violated Police Department policy when he first drew his firearm. However, because Jackson quickly returned to his car when he was told he was under arrest, Jackson created a reasonable suspicion in the mind of Officer Cochran that Jackson might be going to get a weapon. Therefore, Officer Cochran did not violate Police Department policy when he drew his firearm. Thereafter, however, it was apparent to Officer Cochran that Jackson had not returned to the car to get a weapon and that Jackson did not have a weapon. Officer Cochran was not justified in shooting Jackson for resisting and fleeing from an attempted arrest for transporting a child without a car seat. See Light v. State, 796 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)(police officers had no authority to use deadly force to arrest a person who had committed only a misdemeanor).

To state a claim for negligence under Florida law, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, that the defendant breached the duty, and that the breach caused the plaintiff to suffer damages. Paterson v. Deeb, 472 So. 2d 1210, 1214 (Fla. 1985).

Although the decision to make an arrest is a discretionary governmental function which does not give rise to a duty of care that can be breached, the actions of law enforcement officers in conducting an arrest can create a duty to exercise reasonable care. See, generally, Wallace v. Dean, 3 So. 3d 1035 (Fla. 2009). In Lewis v. City of St. Petersburg, 260 F. 3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2001), it was held that when a police officer draws his or her firearm, the officer owes a duty to act with reasonable care to all persons that are within the zone of risk associated with the discharge of the firearm. The court stated that Florida law clearly recognizes a cause of action for the

negligent handling of a firearm and the negligent decision to use a firearm.

In City of Miami v. Sanders, 672 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), the appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment for the plaintiff for negligent use of excessive force by a police officer during an arrest, stating that "there is no such thing as a negligent commission of an intentional tort." The court stated that the proper action would be for the intentional tort of battery in which the analysis would focus on whether the force used was reasonable under the circumstances. The court went on to say that there can be a distinct cause of action for negligence brought against a police officer separate from the claim of excessive force, but "the negligence component must pertain to something other than the actual application of force during the course of the arrest." Id., at 48.

Ansley v. Heinrich, 925 F. 2d 1339 (11th Cir. 1991) involved several claims against two deputy sheriffs for shooting a man who was carrying a handgun, but had not been observed to have committed a crime. The appellate court did not address the negligence claim, but mentioned that the trial court entered a judgment against the Hillsborough County Sheriff for negligence. Mazzilli v. Doud, 485 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) involved the review of a trial court's judgment against the City of Hialeah for assault and battery and negligence by a Hialeah police officer who shot a federal drug enforcement officer, believing that the federal officer was a felon. The appellate court found "ample evidence" to support the jury's conclusion that the police officer was negligent. These cases do not remove all doubt about the proper application of the law of negligence to a law enforcement officer's use of his or her firearm, but these cases along with the Jackson case make three known cases where a judgment of negligence was entered. Accordingly, my recommendation is based on the premise that negligence is a proper cause of action.

Jackson was within the zone of risk created when Officer Cochran drew his weapon and, therefore, Officer Cochran owed Jackson a duty to act with reasonable care. Officer Cochran did not act with reasonable care when he fired his weapon. Contributing to the finding that Officer Cochran did not act with reasonable care is the fact that the discharge of his firearm endangered the life of the child sitting next to Jackson. Officer Cochran breached his duty to Jackson and

the breach was the proximate cause of Jackson's injuries. Officer Cochran was acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the incident. Therefore, the City, as his employer, is be liable for Officer Cochran's negligence and the damages that resulted.

The jury award is reasonable for the injuries that Jackson suffered.

ATTORNEY'S FEES AND LOBBYIST'S FEES:

In compliance with s. 768.28(8), F.S. Jackson's attorneys agreed to limit their fees to 25 percent of any amount awarded by the Legislature. They have not acknowledged the requirement of the claim bill that costs and lobbyist's fees be included in the 25 percent figure.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

This is the first claim bill filed for Reginald Jackson.

RECOMMENDATION:

For the reasons set forth above, I recommend that Senate Bill 66 (2010) be reported FAVORABLY.

Respectfully submitted,

Bram D. E. Canter  
Senate Special Master

cc: Senator Chris Smith  
R. Philip Twogood, Secretary of the Senate  
Counsel of Record