Florida Senate - 2018 (NP) SB 22
By Senator Braynon
35-00148-18 201822__
1 A bill to be entitled
2 An act for the relief of Brian Pitts; directing the
3 Division of Administrative Hearings to appoint an
4 administrative law judge or special master to
5 determine a basis for equitable relief for the purpose
6 of compensating Mr. Pitts for the wrongful acts or
7 omissions of the State of Florida or officials
8 thereof; requiring a report to the Legislature;
9 authorizing compensation to Mr. Pitts upon a
10 determination by an administrative law judge;
11 providing an appropriation to compensate Mr. Pitts for
12 injuries and damages sustained; providing a limitation
13 on attorney fees and costs; directing that certain
14 court orders and judgments be declared null and void;
15 directing that the clerk of the court for the Supreme
16 Court and for the Sixth Judicial Circuit remove access
17 to specified cases; directing the Department of Law
18 Enforcement to remove access to criminal records
19 related to Mr. Pitts and to ensure the compliance,
20 execution, and enforcement of specified provisions;
21 specifying the limited circumstances under which Mr.
22 Pitts may represent himself or others in judicial or
23 administrative proceedings; directing the Department
24 of Law Enforcement to investigate certain illegal acts
25 committed by certain persons; authorizing the
26 Governor, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker
27 of the House of Representatives to sever portions of
28 this act under certain circumstances; providing an
29 effective date.
30
31 WHEREAS, this state has clearly recognized the practice of
32 law by lay persons since at least 1980 as declared in The
33 Florida Bar v. Moses, 380 So. 2d 412, 416-418 (Fla. 1980), and
34 in The Florida Bar re Advisory Opinion on Nonlawyer
35 Representation in Securities Arbitration, 696 So. 2d 1178, 1180
36 1181, 1183-1184 (Fla. 1997), the Legislature and judiciary
37 having concurrent jurisdiction to regulate such, and
38 WHEREAS, Brian Pitts has exercised this privilege since
39 2001 in Pinellas County, and his practice was later enjoined by
40 the Florida Supreme Court in case number SC02-247, in a final
41 order dated November 6, 2003. As stated in the order,
42 “respondent Brian Pitts is enjoined from engaging in the
43 practice of law in the State of Florida as specified in the
44 referee’s report. Specifically, respondent is hereby enjoined
45 from engaging in any of the following activities: (1) appearing
46 in any Florida court as a representative of a party, giving
47 legal advice in a Florida case, or otherwise participating in
48 any Florida litigation on behalf of any party unless otherwise
49 authorized by Florida Statutes, court rule, case law,
50 administrative rule, or the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar . .
51 . .” See The Florida Bar v. Pitts, 861 So. 2d 432 (Fla.
52 2003)(No. SC02-247, November 6, 2003),
53 www.floridasupremecourt.org, and
54 WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts contends that, since the inception of
55 Mr. Pitts’ practice, the Second District Court of Appeal, the
56 Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida serving Pasco and Pinellas
57 Counties, the State Attorney’s Office for the Sixth Judicial
58 Circuit of Florida, and The Florida Bar have, without cause,
59 continued to deprive Mr. Pitts of the privilege of practicing
60 law as prescribed by the Legislature and Florida Supreme Court,
61 subjecting him to civil and criminal proceedings and penalties
62 on an ongoing basis, and
63 WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts opines that the Florida Supreme Court,
64 in its 2003 final order in case number SC02-247, has subjected
65 him to entrapment and needlessly and unjustly avoided and failed
66 to exercise its constitutional duty upon his many requests to
67 clarify or amend the final order or to promulgate court rules
68 through The Florida Bar following original proceedings brought
69 or suggested by Mr. Pitts to correct the matter, and
70 WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts believes that from 2001 to 2012 the
71 courts, The Florida Bar, and the State Attorney’s Office for the
72 Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida engaged in a course of
73 misconduct and colluded against Mr. Pitts in case numbers SC02
74 247, SC06-1279, CRCAB-65835CFANO, CRCAB-90407CFANO, CRC07
75 12964CFANO, CTC07-03965MMANO, CTC03-01885MMANO, CTC03
76 01887MMANO, and CTC03-09855MMANO and that such misconduct
77 resulted in his wrongful and unlawful incarceration in the
78 Pinellas County Jail for a total of nearly 1 year, and
79 WHEREAS, the purpose of this course of misconduct was, in
80 Mr. Pitts’ opinion, to retaliate against him for not being a
81 member of The Florida Bar despite being otherwise lawfully
82 authorized to represent certain individuals whom he assisted in
83 legitimate legal matters and, by way of his detainment, to
84 thwart his pending pro se actions for relief from the collusion
85 by civil, appellate, or original proceedings directed to or from
86 the above criminal cases, and
87 WHEREAS, appearing pro se in many of his cases, Mr. Pitts
88 was complimented by several judges of the Sixth Judicial Circuit
89 for an exceptional degree of technical and performance
90 competence that would be expected of any trained and experienced
91 member of The Florida Bar, yet he was informed by express or
92 implied communication that he would not receive the relief
93 requested in any such proceeding unless represented by a member
94 of The Florida Bar, as a matter of camaraderie, and
95 WHEREAS, although Mr. Pitts appeared pro se in these cases
96 and other actions seeking relief from such collusion, he was at
97 times represented by appointed counsel; however, such
98 proceedings proved to be futile because, Mr. Pitts contends, the
99 proceedings were staged by the courts and the State Attorney’s
100 Office for the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida to be illusory,
101 and
102 WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts contends that the courts failed to abide
103 by binding precedent and stare decisis, where applicable, as
104 well as Florida Rules of Court, as evidenced by the series of
105 filings in each case by Mr. Pitts, or his court-appointed
106 counsel, hence depriving Mr. Pitts of procedural due process and
107 substantive due process, equal protection of the law, self
108 representation, and representation by counsel under the United
109 States Constitution, and
110 WHEREAS, the Second District Court of Appeal declared in
111 Denson v. State, 711 So. 2d 1225, 1230 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), that
112 “appellate judges take an oath to uphold the law and the
113 constitution of this state. The citizens of this state properly
114 expect these judges to protect their rights. When reviewing an
115 appeal with a preserved issue, if we discover that a person has
116 been subjected to a patently illegal sentence to which no
117 objection was lodged in the trial court, neither the
118 constitution nor our own consciences will allow us to remain
119 silent and hope that the prisoner, untrained in the law, will
120 somehow discover the error and request its correction. If three
121 appellate judges, like a statue of the ‘see no evil, hear no
122 evil, speak no evil’ monkeys, declined to consider such serious,
123 patent errors, we would jeopardize the public’s trust and
124 confidence in the institution of courts of law.” Compare Bedford
125 v. State, 633 So. 2d 13, 14 (Fla. 1994), and
126 WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts contends that the judges who presided in
127 his cases have deliberately and intentionally, in concert with
128 the Florida Supreme Court justices, failed to abide by these
129 rules of law as to Mr. Pitts’ cases on appeal or by original
130 proceedings brought and maintained by him or his counsel, and
131 WHEREAS, it has become evident, in Mr. Pitts’ opinion, that
132 The Florida Bar, the State Attorney’s Office for the Sixth
133 Judicial Circuit of Florida, and the judges and justices
134 involved at each level of Mr. Pitts’ cases all have a personal
135 and private, rather than public, interest at issue in deterring
136 Mr. Pitts from engaging in the authorized practice of law as
137 prescribed in this state, and
138 WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts believes that such determent is due to a
139 matter of camaraderie among those of the legal profession and an
140 interest in protecting it by any means from lawful competition,
141 where applicable, and
142 WHEREAS, this determent demonstrates a lack of neutrality,
143 proper motives, and discretion which deprives Mr. Pitts of the
144 required process and means of justice or resolution as normally
145 expected of esteemed persons in their official capacities, and
146 WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts believes that the Pinellas County
147 Sheriff’s Office further participated in the concerted effort of
148 the courts, The Florida Bar, and the State Attorney’s Office for
149 the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida by illegally incarcerating
150 him in the Pinellas County Jail during the periods of January
151 2003 through April 2004 and March 12, 2010, through July 4,
152 2010, refusing him administrative alternative sentencing without
153 cause, and subjecting him to living conditions and circumstances
154 in violation of Florida Model Jail Standards (2.15)(c); (4.12);
155 (4.13); (4.15); (5.08)(a), (c)(1)-(8), and (j); (6.02);
156 (9.06)(b); (9.08); (9.10); (10.01); (11.12); (11.16);
157 (12.03)(d)-(g) and (i); (12.06); and Appendix A; and ss. 951.03
158 and 951.033(3), Florida Statutes, and
159 WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts also contends that the Pinellas County
160 Sheriff’s Office further participated in the concerted effort of
161 the courts, The Florida Bar, and the State Attorney’s Office for
162 the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida by extending his sentence
163 by an additional 50 days of detention in violation of Inmate
164 Handbook XI. A., Florida Model Jail Standard (4.16), and ss.
165 951.21(1) and 921.16(1), Florida Statutes, which subjected him
166 to cruel and unusual punishment, false imprisonment, and a
167 denial of due process and equal protection of the law. See
168 Miller v. Carson, 599 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1979); Miller v.
169 Carson, 563 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1977); Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d
170 741 (5th Cir. 1977); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835 (M.D.
171 Fla. 1975); Miller v. Carson, 392 F. Supp. 515 (M.D. Fla. 1975);
172 Solomos v. Jenne, 776 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Douthit v.
173 Jones, 619 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1980), and
174 WHEREAS, such conditions and circumstances of the jail are
175 reflected in a St. Petersburg Times article dated July 5, 2010,
176 appearing under the headline “Thousands of Pinellas jail inmates
177 released without a judge ever setting bail,” which is
178 complemented by a series of articles released by the Orlando
179 Sentinel, including “Florida’s suspect jails: The state’s hands
180 off approach to inspecting jails leaves them vulnerable,” dated
181 April 8, 2010; “Jail-standards chief defends system of checks,”
182 dated May 15, 2010; “If all Central Florida jails rate an A, is
183 it deserved?” dated May 15, 2010; and “Beef up jail oversight:
184 Florida jails need tough oversight, not coddling,” dated May 18,
185 2010; and other articles, and
186 WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts contends that such conduct was a clear
187 abuse of judicial, executive, and administrative authority as to
188 the state court system and local government, including the State
189 Attorney’s Office for the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida and
190 the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office, which resulted in a public
191 embarrassment to this state because such authorities knew that
192 there was not any basis in fact or law for their unlawful acts
193 against him, and
194 WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts believes that his good name and
195 reputation have been damaged; he has been deprived of due
196 process, the ability to conduct a lawful business, freedom of
197 speech, property, liberty, and equal protection of the law; he
198 has not benefited from constitutional protections against
199 unlawful trusts by public officers and employees under oath of
200 office and double jeopardy protections as to criminal
201 proceedings and sanctions; and he has suffered mental anguish
202 and emotional distress as the result of the intentional
203 misconduct and gross negligence of the courts, the State
204 Attorney’s Office for the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida, The
205 Florida Bar, and the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office relating
206 to his practice of law as a nonlawyer in this state, and,
207 further, that there is no state-action exception to federal
208 antitrust laws, which were violated in the subject cases, and
209 WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts has suffered, and continues to suffer,
210 significant monetary damage by virtue of lost income, lost
211 property, lost time, and expenses, fees, fines, costs, and
212 required restitution resulting from the civil and criminal
213 proceedings relating to his alleged unauthorized or unlicensed
214 practice of law, and
215 WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts frequently appears before the
216 Legislature to instruct, advise, inform, and advocate for or
217 against proposed legislation covering a broad spectrum of topics
218 and subject matter in fact and law with an exceptional degree of
219 technical competence that would be expected of any trained and
220 experienced member of The Florida Bar, and
221 WHEREAS, the Legislature recognizes that no system of
222 justice is impervious to human error, and
223 WHEREAS, the Legislature acknowledges that any system of
224 justice may sometimes yield imperfect results that may have
225 tragic consequences, and
226 WHEREAS, this claim is based on a moral and legal
227 obligation of the Legislature to acknowledge its actions and act
228 on its authority to correct a wrong when those actions have
229 resulted in a manifest injustice or disregard for the law, and
230 WHEREAS, the filing of this claim bill is in accord with
231 the holdings of the Florida Supreme Court regarding legislative
232 claim bills. See Circuit Court of Twelfth Judicial Circuit v.
233 Dep’t of Natural Res., 339 So. 2d 1113, 1116-1117 (Fla.
234 1976)(”Absent legislation waiving the state’s sovereign immunity
235 . . . this Court cannot authorize relief through the judicial
236 process”); Gerard v. Dep’t of Transp., 472 So. 2d 1170, 1172
237 (Fla. 1985)(“[W]e agree with the Department of Transportation’s
238 assertion that a judgment in this case was not a prerequisite to
239 Gerard’s filing a claims bill in the legislature.”), and
240 WHEREAS, the First District Court of Appeal in Jetton v.
241 Jacksonville Electric Authority, 399 So. 2d 396, 397 (Fla. 1st
242 DCA 1981), stated that although the Legislature has placed
243 limits on recovery, “claimants remain free to seek legislative
244 relief bills, as they did during days of complete sovereign
245 immunity,” and
246 WHEREAS, the Florida Supreme Court in Dickinson v. Bradley,
247 298 So. 2d 352, 354 (Fla. 1974), held that “any claim bill is
248 restricted to less than the general public and its purpose is to
249 discharge the state’s moral obligation to any individual or
250 other entity whom or which the legislature recognizes as being
251 entitled to such. . . . The legislature may enact a claim bill
252 for what would be a tort if a private party was involved just as
253 effectively as for what would constitute a contractual debt,”
254 and
255 WHEREAS, the Legislature intends that any compensation made
256 pursuant to this act be the sole compensation provided by the
257 state for any and all present and future claims arising out of
258 the facts presented in this act, NOW, THEREFORE,
259
260 Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:
261
262 Section 1. The facts stated in the preamble to this act are
263 found and declared to be true, and all judicial and
264 administrative remedies were exhausted as of September 9, 2003
265 April 30, 2004; September 30, 2005; May 21, 2007; September 7,
266 2007; December 12, 2008; September 14, 2009; February 22, 2010;
267 March 11-July 4, 2010; and March 30, 2012, respectively.
268 Section 2. The Division of Administrative Hearings shall
269 appoint an administrative law judge, or a special master shall
270 be appointed, to conduct a hearing to determine a basis for
271 equitable relief for the purpose of compensating Brian Pitts for
272 any wrongful act or omission of the State of Florida, the State
273 Attorney’s Office for the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida, and
274 the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office regarding investigations
275 involving Mr. Pitts, the civil and criminal proceedings relating
276 to Mr. Pitts’ alleged unauthorized or unlicensed practice of
277 law, and his incarcerations totaling nearly 12 months from 2001
278 to 2012, if not longer.
279 Section 3. (1) The administrative law judge or special
280 master shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence
281 whether the State of Florida, the State Attorney’s Office for
282 the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida, or the Pinellas County
283 Sheriff’s Office committed a wrongful act or omission and
284 whether a basis for equitable relief exists, and if it so finds,
285 the administrative law judge or special master shall award Mr.
286 Pitts an amount of up to $7 million, but not less than $1
287 million, to be paid proportionately by the parties that wronged
288 him and to be paid in a lump sum or in payments over a period of
289 no more than 10 years.
290 (2) The administrative law judge or special master shall
291 report his or her determination to the President of the Senate
292 and the Speaker of the House of Representatives by July 1, 2018.
293 The Chief Financial Officer is directed to draw a warrant in
294 satisfaction of the relief awarded by the administrative law
295 judge, special master, or Legislature, as provided in this act,
296 and to pay the warrant out of the Administrative Trust Fund or
297 State Courts Revenue Trust Fund within the state courts system
298 and the State Attorneys Revenue Trust Fund to Brian Pitts.
299 Pinellas County shall pay the warrant out of its general revenue
300 fund or by other means it has provided to pay valid claims
301 against it relating to the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office and
302 as to its share of the total award to Mr. Pitts.
303 (3) This award is intended to provide the sole compensation
304 for all present and future claims arising out of the factual
305 situation described in this act which resulted in unlawful or
306 unconstitutional acts committed against Mr. Pitts in connection
307 with allegations, judgments, and convictions of the unauthorized
308 or unlicensed practice of law and his incarcerations totaling
309 nearly 12 months, if not longer, from 2001 through 2012. The
310 total amount paid for attorney fees, lobbying fees, costs, and
311 other similar expenses relating to this claim may not exceed 25
312 percent of the amount awarded under this act.
313 (4) All final orders, judgments, decrees, and convictions,
314 and orders or liens pertaining to fees, fines, costs, and
315 restitution, rendered in cases SC06-1279, SC09-195 and SC09
316 2243, CRCAB-90407CFANO, CRCAB-65835CFANO, CRC07-12964CFANO,
317 CTC07-03965MMANO, CTC03-09855MMANO, CTC03-01885MMANO, and CTC03
318 01887MMANO in which Mr. Pitts is the respondent or defendant are
319 null and void by this act by virtue of the doctrine of
320 separation of powers because the courts failed to recognize the
321 Legislature’s lawful and valid enactments, in addition to the
322 courts’ own lawful and valid case precedent, rules, and orders,
323 authorizing lay representation as expressed in The Florida Bar
324 v. Moses, 380 So. 2d 412, 416-418 (Fla. 1980); by virtue of
325 inherent authority of this Legislature as expressed in Florida
326 House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 611 (Fla.
327 2008) and Trianon Park Condominium Ass’n v. City of Hialeah, 468
328 So. 2d 912, 918, 919 (Fla. 1985); by virtue of checks and
329 balances exercised by this Legislature as expressed in State Ex
330 Rel. Young v. Duval County, 79 So. 692, 697 (Fla. 1918), in
331 which the court found, “[a] clear violation of the
332 constitutional provisions dividing the powers of government into
333 departments should be checked and remedied.” As the court found
334 in State v. City of Stuart, 120 So. 335, 346 (Fla. 1929), “[t]he
335 general rule is that the Legislature is supreme in the
336 legislative field, which is the most powerful branch of
337 government, so long as it does not violate any of the provisions
338 of the organic law. There is to our minds no justifiable
339 exception of any class of legislation from this all-pervasive
340 and fundamental principle.” Finally, by virtue of the cases
341 involving Mr. Pitts, the courts failed to comply with the
342 mandates of s. 20.02(1), Florida Statutes, which states that
343 “[t]he judicial branch has the purpose of determining the
344 constitutional propriety of the policies and programs and of
345 adjudicating any conflicts arising from the interpretation or
346 application of the laws.”
347 (5) The clerk of the court for the Florida Supreme Court,
348 as to cases SC06-1279, SC09-195, and SC09-2243, and the clerk of
349 the court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, as to cases CRCAB
350 90407CFANO, CRCAB-65835CFANO, CRC07-12964CFANO, CTC07
351 03965MMANO, CTC03-09855MMANO, CTC03-01885MMANO, and CTC03
352 01887MMANO, all pertaining to Mr. Pitts, are hereby directed to
353 remove from public and private access all dockets, records,
354 documents, and recorded orders or liens related to those cases
355 and transmit them to the Department of Law Enforcement to
356 fulfill the duties required under section 6 of this act. The
357 Department of Law Enforcement is hereby directed to remove from
358 public and private access all record history and information of
359 a criminal nature concerning Mr. Pitts. This record history and
360 information include, but are not limited to, fingerprints, felon
361 registration, and all other matters concerning the case numbers
362 cited in this subsection. These records, information, or
363 documents may not be used by or accessed for any purpose by
364 anyone unless access to those records is required by federal
365 authorities or for investigations conducted under section 6 of
366 this act.
367 (6) The Department of Law Enforcement is directed to ensure
368 the compliance, execution, and enforcement of subsections (4)
369 and (5) of this section and section 6, and shall provide
370 protective services to Mr. Pitts ensuring his rights,
371 privileges, and safety under sections 4, 5, and 6 of this act.
372 Section 4. In accordance with the Florida Supreme Court’s
373 final order in case number SC02-247 and the exception contained
374 in clause (1) of that order, unless otherwise authorized by
375 Florida Statutes, court rule, case law, administrative rule, or
376 the rules regulating The Florida Bar, thereby authorizing Mr.
377 Pitts to practice law in this state, the Legislature authorizes
378 Mr. Pitts to practice law in this state under the following
379 designations, titles, rules, decisions, or acts in the capacity
380 as a lay counselor or lay representative:
381 (1) Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, relating to a qualified
382 representative.
383 (2) Chapter 44, Florida Statutes, relating to a designated
384 representative.
385 (3) Chapter 709, Florida Statutes, relating to an attorney
386 in-fact under a durable power of attorney, when coupled with an
387 interest in any personal or property claim, election, right, or
388 interest.
389 (4) Decisions or rules of the Florida Supreme Court
390 relating to representation in real property management.
391 (5) Decisions or rules of the Florida Supreme Court
392 relating to a nonlawyer using approved forms.
393 (6) Decisions or rules of the Florida Supreme Court
394 relating to representation in county or small claims civil
395 proceedings.
396 (7) Decisions or rules of the Florida Supreme Court
397 relating to third-party standing representation.
398 (8) Rule 5-15, Rules of the Supreme Court Relating to
399 Admission to the Bar.
400 (9) Judicial discretion under the inherent authority
401 doctrine.
402 (10) Federal law, state law, local rule, statute, local
403 law, or any other court or administrative decision or order
404 issued under federal, state, or local law and authority.
405 Section 5. Any appearance or public testimony given by Mr.
406 Pitts on bills or matters before the Legislature, wherever held
407 or convened throughout this state, does not constitute the
408 practice of law. In all circumstances Mr. Pitts retains the
409 right to represent himself at any time he has valid standing
410 supported by law. If Mr. Pitts is the subject of civil,
411 administrative, or criminal proceedings, he retains the right to
412 represent himself without a lawyer in court and in
413 administrative actions or cases.
414 Section 6. Due to the ongoing conduct from 2001 to 2012
415 against Mr. Pitts as described in the preamble of this act, the
416 Legislature directs the Department of Law Enforcement, assisted
417 by Mr. Pitts, to investigate these acts committed by:
418 (1) The Florida Supreme Court justices involved for
419 violations of s. 914.22(2)(f) or (4)(f), Florida Statutes, and
420 18 U.S.C. 1512, relating to their final ruling rendered on
421 February 22, 2010, in case number SC06-1279, which resulted in
422 the incarceration of Mr. Pitts on the eve of the 2010
423 Legislative Session while proceedings on SB 58 were pending, and
424 in Mr. Pitts’ cases relating to motions, reviews, and original
425 proceedings for violations of ss. 542.21(2), 775.15(12)(b),
426 777.04(2) and (3), 836.05, 838.015, 838.016, 838.022, 839.13(1),
427 839.24, 843.03, 843.0855(2) and (3), 876.10, 895.03, and 918.13,
428 Florida Statutes; 15 U.S.C. 1, 2, and 3; and 18 U.S.C. 201, 241,
429 242, 1951, and 1962.
430 (2) The Second District Court of Appeal judges assigned to
431 Mr. Pitts’ cases on motions, reviews, and original proceedings;
432 the Sixth Judicial Circuit judges; and the state attorneys
433 involved in violations of ss. 542.21(2), 775.15(12)(b),
434 777.04(2) and (3), 836.05, 838.015, 838.016, 838.022, 839.13(1),
435 839.24, 843.03, 843.0855(2) and (3), 876.10, 895.03, and 918.13,
436 Florida Statutes; 15 U.S.C. 1, 2, and 3; and 18 U.S.C. 201, 241,
437 242, 1951, and 1962.
438 (3) The Florida Bar and its representatives who pursued
439 charges of unlicensed practice of law against Mr. Pitts for
440 their violations of ss. 542.21(2), 777.04(2) and (3), 836.05,
441 838.015, 838.016, 839.13(1), 895.03, and 918.13, Florida
442 Statutes; 15 U.S.C. 1, 2, and 3; and 18 U.S.C. 201, 241, 242,
443 1951, and 1962.
444 (4) The Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office for violations of
445 ss. 775.15(12)(b), 839.13(1), 843.03, 843.0855(2) and (3),
446 876.10, 950.09, and 951.14, Florida Statutes, and 18 U.S.C. 201,
447 241, or 242.
448
449 The Department of Law Enforcement shall exercise all authority
450 granted to it under general law to investigate criminal
451 violations under this act and shall refer any evidence of such
452 crimes to the appropriate state attorney for prosecution.
453 Failure of the Department to Law Enforcement to investigate
454 these criminal violations and refer any evidence of such
455 violations to the appropriate officials is a misdemeanor of the
456 first degree under s. 775.15(12)(b), Florida Statutes. Charges
457 arising out of the criminal investigation shall be brought
458 before a grand jury impaneled in Leon County within 1 year after
459 passage of this act.
460 Section 7. The Governor, the President of the Senate, or
461 the Speaker of the House of Representatives may sever in whole
462 or in part any section of this act, excluding this section,
463 which remaining parts shall be in full force and effect upon
464 becoming law. Notwithstanding severance, Brian Pitts shall
465 retain the right or privilege during future legislative sessions
466 to request the relief severed in whole or in part by virtue of
467 this section until fully remedied.
468 Section 8. This act shall take effect upon becoming a law.