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2021 Florida Statutes (Including 2021B Session)

Title XLVII CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND CORRECTIONS
Chapter 901 ARRESTS AND TEMPORARY DETENTIONS Entire Chapter
SECTION 15
When arrest by officer without warrant is lawful.
F.S. 901.15
901.15 When arrest by officer without warrant is lawful.—A law enforcement officer may arrest a person without a warrant when:
(1) The person has committed a felony or misdemeanor or violated a municipal or county ordinance in the presence of the officer. An arrest for the commission of a misdemeanor or the violation of a municipal or county ordinance shall be made immediately or in fresh pursuit.
(2) A felony has been committed and he or she reasonably believes that the person committed it.
(3) He or she reasonably believes that a felony has been or is being committed and that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing it.
(4) A warrant for the arrest has been issued and is held by another peace officer for execution.
(5) A violation of chapter 316 has been committed in the presence of the officer. Such an arrest may be made immediately or in fresh pursuit. Any law enforcement officer, upon receiving information relayed to him or her from a fellow officer stationed on the ground or in the air that a driver of a vehicle has violated chapter 316, may arrest the driver for violation of those laws when reasonable and proper identification of the vehicle and the violation has been communicated to the arresting officer.
(6) There is probable cause to believe that the person has committed a criminal act according to s. 790.233 or according to s. 741.31, s. 784.047, or s. 825.1036 which violates an injunction for protection entered pursuant to s. 741.30, s. 784.046, or s. 825.1035 or a foreign protection order accorded full faith and credit pursuant to s. 741.315, over the objection of the petitioner, if necessary.
(7) There is probable cause to believe that the person has committed an act of domestic violence, as defined in s. 741.28, or dating violence, as provided in s. 784.046. The decision to arrest shall not require consent of the victim or consideration of the relationship of the parties. It is the public policy of this state to strongly discourage arrest and charges of both parties for domestic violence or dating violence on each other and to encourage training of law enforcement and prosecutors in these areas. A law enforcement officer who acts in good faith and exercises due care in making an arrest under this subsection, under s. 741.31(4) or s. 784.047, or pursuant to a foreign order of protection accorded full faith and credit pursuant to s. 741.315, is immune from civil liability that otherwise might result by reason of his or her action.
(8) There is probable cause to believe that the person has committed child abuse, as defined in s. 827.03, or has violated s. 787.025, relating to luring or enticing a child for unlawful purposes. The decision to arrest does not require consent of the victim or consideration of the relationship of the parties. It is the public policy of this state to protect abused children by strongly encouraging the arrest and prosecution of persons who commit child abuse. A law enforcement officer who acts in good faith and exercises due care in making an arrest under this subsection is immune from civil liability that otherwise might result by reason of his or her action.
(9) There is probable cause to believe that the person has committed:
(a) Any battery upon another person, as defined in s. 784.03.
(b) An act of criminal mischief or a graffiti-related offense as described in s. 806.13.
(c) A violation of a safety zone, security zone, regulated navigation area, or naval vessel protection zone as described in s. 327.461.
(d) A racing violation as described in s. 316.191(2).
(e) An exposure of sexual organs in violation of s. 800.03.
(10) The officer has determined that he or she has probable cause to believe that a misdemeanor has been committed, based upon a signed affidavit provided to the officer by a law enforcement officer of the United States Government, recognized as such by United States statute, or a United States military law enforcement officer, recognized as such by the Uniform Code of Military Justice or the United States Department of Defense Regulations, when the misdemeanor was committed in the presence of the United States law enforcement officer or the United States military law enforcement officer on federal military property over which the state has maintained exclusive jurisdiction for such a misdemeanor.
(11)(a) A law enforcement officer of the Florida National Guard, recognized as such by the Uniform Code of Military Justice or the United States Department of Defense Regulations, has probable cause to believe a felony was committed on state military property or when a felony or misdemeanor was committed in his or her presence on such property.
(b) All law enforcement officers of the Florida National Guard shall promptly surrender all persons arrested and charged with a felony to the sheriff of the county within which the state military property is located, and all persons arrested and charged with misdemeanors shall be surrendered to the applicable authority as may be provided by law, but otherwise to the sheriff of the county in which the state military property is located. The Florida National Guard shall promptly notify the applicable law enforcement agency of an arrest and the location of the prisoner.
(c) The Adjutant General, in consultation with the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, shall prescribe minimum training standards for such law enforcement officers of the Florida National Guard.
(12) He or she is employed by the State of Florida as a law enforcement officer as defined in s. 943.10(1) or part-time law enforcement officer as defined in s. 943.10(6), and:
(a) He or she reasonably believes that a felony involving violence has been or is being committed and that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing the felony;
(b) While engaged in the exercise of his or her state law enforcement duties, the officer reasonably believes that a felony has been or is being committed; or
(c) A felony warrant for the arrest has been issued and is being held for execution by another peace officer.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the authority of an officer pursuant to this subsection is statewide. This subsection does not limit the arrest authority conferred on such officer by any other provision of law.

(13) There is probable cause to believe that the person has committed an act that violates a condition of pretrial release provided in s. 903.047 when the original arrest was for an act of domestic violence as defined in s. 741.28, or when the original arrest was for an act of dating violence as defined in s. 784.046.
(14) There is probable cause to believe that the person has committed trespass in a secure area of an airport when signs are posted in conspicuous areas of the airport which notify that unauthorized entry into such areas constitutes a trespass and specify the methods for gaining authorized access to such areas. An arrest under this subsection may be made on or off airport premises. A law enforcement officer who acts in good faith and exercises due care in making an arrest under this subsection is immune from civil liability that otherwise might result by reason of the law enforcement officer’s action.
(15) There is probable cause to believe that the person has committed assault upon a law enforcement officer, a firefighter, an emergency medical care provider, public transit employees or agents, or other specified officers as set forth in s. 784.07 or has committed assault or battery upon any employee of a receiving facility as defined in s. 394.455 who is engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties.
(16) There is probable cause to believe that the person has committed a criminal act of sexual cyberharassment as described in s. 784.049.
History.—s. 15, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(15); s. 1, ch. 21782, 1943; s. 6, ch. 70-339; s. 4, ch. 71-982; s. 1, ch. 77-67; s. 1, ch. 83-119; s. 11, ch. 84-343; s. 1, ch. 85-198; s. 2, ch. 85-216; s. 1, ch. 86-130; s. 102, ch. 86-220; s. 1, ch. 87-45; s. 1, ch. 87-285; s. 2, ch. 88-344; s. 4, ch. 88-373; ss. 53, 71, ch. 88-381; s. 1, ch. 90-165; s. 68, ch. 91-110; s. 7, ch. 91-210; ss. 27, 29, ch. 94-134; ss. 27, 29, ch. 94-135; s. 20, ch. 95-195; s. 4, ch. 96-215; s. 24, ch. 96-322; s. 8, ch. 96-392; s. 68, ch. 96-413; ss. 1830, 1831, 1832, ch. 97-102; s. 10, ch. 97-155; s. 2, ch. 97-298; s. 2, ch. 98-93; s. 4, ch. 98-284; s. 105, ch. 99-3; s. 57, ch. 99-193; s. 6, ch. 2000-369; s. 1, ch. 2002-255; s. 4, ch. 2004-17; s. 7, ch. 2004-74; s. 8, ch. 2006-299; s. 4, ch. 2007-112; s. 3, ch. 2008-252; s. 9, ch. 2009-215; s. 4, ch. 2015-17; s. 2, ch. 2015-24; s. 7, ch. 2016-187; s. 4, ch. 2018-100; s. 2, ch. 2019-53; s. 2, ch. 2019-125; s. 2, ch. 2020-84.